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1. Introduction
Currently in Italy, rhetorical studies are mainly carried out by classicists, lin-
guists and scholars of literature, but little (or nothing) is done by philosophers1. 
This lack of interest probably depends on the persistence of a general (and deep 
seated) prejudice against rhetoric. Indeed, despite several attempts to re-evaluate 
this ancient techne, the idea that rhetoric does not have any depth and has nothing 
to do with truth still exists (Piazza 2004). In this paper, I will argue the contrary: 
that rhetoric – especially if it is intended in an Aristotelian sense – still has much 
to contribute to philosophy and especially to the philosophy of language. The most 
common way to demonstrate rhetoric’s vitality is to compare it with other (ancient 
as well as modern) disciplines2. In many cases this comparison confi nes itself to 
identifying similarities and differences and often considers rhetoric like an ance-
stor, which may be noble but still is only a relic from the past (Piazza 2013).
Although this kind of comparison can be fruitful, on this occasion I will follow 
another path. My aim is not to show the relationship between rhetoric and the 
philosophy of language or to consider rhetoric as a (more or less important) part of 
the philosophy of language. I have another aim: I intend to argue that rhetoric can 
be a fruitful way of practicing philosophy, especially the philosophy of language. 
Indeed, I agree with Bottiroli (1993, 49) according to whom “rhetoric is not only 
a way of speaking but also a way of thinking. It is not only the art of persuading, 
but also a style of knowledge” (italics mine). If this is true, a rhetorical point of 
view can enable us to see linguistic phenomena in a different way. Therefore, in 
what follows I will show what this point of view is as well as the reasons why it is 
philosophically fruitful.
1. For a comprehensive review of current rhetorical studies in Italy, see Venier 2013.
2. I refer not only to those disciplines traditionally linked with it (such as poetics or dialectics) but also – to mention 
just the most prominent – aesthetics (Mattioli 1986), linguistics (Mortara Garavelli 2006, Venier 2008), semiotics (Eco 
1986; Lo Russo 2006); argumentation theory (Cattani, et al. 2009; D’Agostini 2009; Rigotti E. 2009), hermeneutics 
(Ferraris 1988), logic (Preti 1968; Marconi 1993), science (Rossi 1986; Pera 1991), ethics (Rigotti F. 1995), politics 
(Ardizzone Berlioz 2005; Santulli, 2005), advertising (Cattani, 2009) and, more recently, also neuroscience (Calabrese 
2013).
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2. Roberto Esposito on features of Italian thought
I start from a suggestion drawn from the work of the Italian philosopher Roberto 
Esposito and especially from what he calls the movement toward the outside. 
According to Esposito (2012, 10-11): 
Italian thought came into the world turned upside down and inside out, as it were, into the world 
of historical and political life. This movement toward the outside has long been identifi ed by 
critics as the most consistent trait of the Italian philosophical tradition. Both the characteristics 
usually attributed to it, the epithet of “civil philosophy” – elaborated upon primarily by Eugenio 
Garin and his school – and its artistic or literary style, are premised on it. The point of tangen-
cy between them, it could be said, lies in the unique propensity of Italian philosophy for the 
non-philosophical.
This particular attitude preserves Italian tradition from the “primacy of language” 
and from the “subordination to the linguistic sphere” typical in almost all other 
philosophical contemporary perspectives3. In other words, thanks to this propensity 
for the non-philosophical, Italian thought is immune to the what is called the 
linguistic turn (Cimatti 2014). This does not mean that:
[t]he sphere of language doesn’t constitute a terrain of philosophical investigation in Italy. On 
the contrary, starting from its origin with Dante and then throughout the period of Humanism up 
to Vico, language has been one of its privileged topics of refl ection, contemplated from a unique 
angle that sometimes interweaves thought and poetic experience, as in the case of Giacomo 
Leopardi. (…) Moreover, the most recent Italian thought takes language as a given that is so 
constitutive of the human being that it can be identifi ed as the point of suture between nature 
and mutation, invariance and difference, biology and history. In this last formulation, however, 
a movement can be discerned that shifts the terms of the discourse in a new direction: rather 
than being examined in its autonomous structure, language is situated within a broader horizon, 
described in terms of biology, or of ontological realism. (Esposito 2012, 7-8; italics mine)
Even though Esposito does not explicitly refer to rhetoric (probably because 
he himself is a victim of the prejudice against rhetoric to some extent), in what 
follows I will argue that this movement toward the outside as well as this inclination 
to situate language within a broader horizon are both typical of the rhetorical 
point of view. This is the main reason why rhetoric can be a way of practicing 
the philosophy of language without being subject to the primacy of language. 
Indeed, language can be better understood if it is situated in a broader horizon 
and considered in its intertwining with non-linguistic components (and activities). 
The rhetorical perspective can be a good way of making this shift. I know that 
this claim might sound paradoxical since, after all, the subject of rhetoric is the 
3. Esposito mainly refers to hermeneutics and to analytic philosophy but he also includes the recent shift toward 
cognitive psychology and neuroscience and states: “regardless of which perspective you have on the quadrant of our 
time, from logic to phenomenology and pragmatics to structuralism, language appears to be the epicentre where all the 
trajectories of thought converge” (Esposito 2012, 6).
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study of language’s power. However, this seems less strange if we consider that 
rhetoric can never avoid considering the external framework and the ultimate goal 
of speech (i.e., persuasion), i.e., a non-linguistic goal. Actually, the real subject 
of rhetoric is not the power of language in general but persuasive speech, which 
necessitates the consideration of extra-linguistic components (such as emotions 
and desires) as well.
3. Aristotle’s Rhetoric as a philosophic work
Before continuing, it is useful to clarify that my proposal takes place against 
an Aristotelian background and assumes that Aristotle’s Rhetoric is a philosophic 
work. This means that, as Garver (1994, 3) says, it is “a piece of philosophic 
inquiry” and therefore it can be read “in the hopes of learning something about 
contemporary philosophic issues”4. Considering Rhetoric as a philosophic work 
also allows us to shed new light on the whole Aristotelian philosophy of langu-
age. As is well known, Aristotle (Rhetoric 1355b 26-27) sees rhetoric not as the 
art of persuasion but as philosophical refl ection about persuasive speech or, more 
exactly, “an ability, in each [particular] case, to see (theorein) the available means 
of persuasion (to endechomenon pithanon)”. This defi nition clearly reveals a the-
oretical point of view on rhetoric and is based on the belief that persuasion plays 
a crucial role in human life. Indeed, at the very beginning of his work Aristotle 
(Rhetoric 1354 a 1-6) says that:
Rhetoric is an antistrophos5 to dialectic; for both are concerned with such things as are, to a 
certain extent, within the knowledge of all people and belong to no separately defi ned science. 
A result is that all people, in some way, share in both; for all, to some extent, try both to test 
and maintain an argument [as in dialectic] and to defend themselves and attack [others, as in 
rhetoric].
This passage reveals a fi rst important feature of the rhetorical point of view: 
although it seems to have a very specifi c subject (persuasive speech), nevertheless 
it concerns an ability that belongs – as a matter of principle – to all human beings. 
Indeed, the real subject of rhetoric is the whole linguistic activity considered from 
a particular point of view, that of persuasion (namely the possibility that speeches 
have effects on the interlocutors and on the world). 
Far from being a fl aw, this is the main asset of the rhetorical way of thinking 
about language. Indeed, looking at language from the point of view of persuasion 
entails having to deal also with what is not (or does not seem to be) linguistic. 
Since rhetoric concerns how our speeches can guide our actions in the world, it 
4. See also Grimaldi (1972) and Piazza (2008).
5. Concerning the word antistrophos, commonly translated “counterpart”, see Kennedy (1991, 28, n.1).
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doesn’t consider – it can’t afford to consider – language as a separate object or 
an autonomous system. Instead, it is obliged to take into account our concrete 
linguistic practices (activities) and their close linkage with other human practices. 
We can also fi nd a similar attitude toward language in A. Gramsci’s work; his 
idea of non-autonomy (independence) of language is such that he extends the se-
mantics of the word “language” so that “it can include the entirety of values and 
attitudes that we wrongly place outside of language” (Lo Piparo 2014a, 78). 
By echoing Esposito’s words, rhetoric makes that movement toward the outside 
thanks to which language rather than being examined in its autonomous structure 
is situated within a broader horizon. This movement protects against the “primacy 
of language” and heightens the awareness that in order to understand the linguistic 
domain we must look beyond it.
4. Aristotle’s philosophy of language
In Aristotle’s Rhetoric, there is a basic insight that can be seen as a sign of this 
movement toward the outside. I refer to the idea according to which speakers and 
listeners are inside and not outside discourse. This is an important move that, 
thanks to the inclusion of extra-linguistic elements, allows us to not consider lan-
guage as an autonomous system.
This insight is explicitly stated in a well-known passage where Aristotle 
(Rhetoric 1358a 37-b1) says that:
Logos is constituted by three elements, by the person speaking, by the topic spoken about and 
by the person spoken to, and the objective (telos) of the speech relates to the last, (I mean the 
hearer).
It is a simple statement, yet it is rich with theoretical consequences. It expresses
a leading principle of Aristotle’s Rhetoric and it is also useful for understanding 
the Aristotelian conception of language and speech. Let us analyze it in detail.
First of all, we should clarify an important point. Unfortunately, this statement 
has often been interpreted as an anticipation of the code-based model of com-
munication (or even of Jakobson’s communicative functions)6. According to this 
view, Aristotle shares the idea of language as a code used by an addresser to send 
a message to an addressee. I believe that this is a misreading of the Aristotelian 
point of view. Indeed, if we read this passage trying to forget the modern termi-
nology, we see that we do not have addressers or addressees here, nor codes or 
messages transferred from one mind to another. In the quoted passage, we only 
have the person speaking, the person spoken to and the topic spoken about. It is 
6. See Kennedy (1991, 47, n. 75) and Venier (2008, 14).
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not just a terminological difference; it is a different point of view on language and 
communication. 
Moreover, to better understand the Aristotelian statement, it should be empha-
sized that it does not concern communication in general but speech (logos) spe-
cifi cally. The person speaking, the person spoken to and the topic spoken about 
are not the constitutive elements of the communicative system, as many scholars 
sustain7. More exactly, they are the components of speech (logos). The difference 
is not superfi cial. Indeed, in the fi rst case, speakers and listeners, even though they 
are essential to the communicative process, are external users. They remain out-
side the logos (that they use to communicate). In this way, the discourse seems to 
only coincide with one of its elements, the “message” or “what is said”. Instead, 
here Aristotle is saying something different: logos is not only “what is said” but 
it is made up of all of the three elements, speaker, listener and topic. Each of the-
se plays a crucial role in building the speech that gains its real consistency only 
thanks to the relationship between these three elements. In this way, speakers and 
listeners can be considered as internal components and not only as external users. 
This is the fi rst – and most important – result of the movement toward the outsi-
de of which Esposito speaks. Indeed, considering the person speaking, the person 
spoken to and the topic spoken about as internal components of speech is a way to 
extend the semantics of the word “language”. It is not by chance that this exten-
sion takes place in the framework of rhetoric. Actually, as we have seen, unlike 
other language sciences, the rhetorical point of view is obliged to take all of the 
concrete elements that contribute to speech’s real consistency into account. 
The Aristotelian sentence quoted above also shows another asset of the rheto-
rical point of view: the primacy of the listener. Indeed, concluding the passage, 
Aristotle stresses that the aim (telos) of the speech relates to the listener. To better 
understand this statement, it is useful to bear in mind that, in the Aristotelian per-
spective, the concept of telos has both logical and ontological priority and it plays 
a crucial role in understanding both natural and artifi cial processes. Therefore, the 
Aristotelian specifi cation clearly means that one of the three components of logos, 
the listener, occupies a key position in the discursive relationship. It is a clear 
reversal of the most usual order that considers the speaker as the starting point of 
a process that is assumed to be linear (Lo Piparo, 2014b). On several occasions, 
Aristotle (Rhetoric 1356b 28) emphasizes the role of the listener, for example, 
when he affi rms that “the persuasive is persuasive to someone” or that, broadly 
speaking, the listener is always a judge (because he/she must pass judgment on 
the speaker’s speech, see Rhetoric 1391b 8-23). To be more precise, this funda-
mental position of the listener does not imply an underestimation of the other two 
7. See Mortara Garavelli (2006, 3).
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elements. Indeed, as was said above, each component is essential to the building 
of logos. Moreover, we should not forget that speakers and listeners continually 
exchange roles in ordinary conversation. Hence, to say that the telos of the speech 
relates to the listener is not only a matter of hierarchy. Instead, it involves seeing 
our talk exchanges from the point of view of listening and not only from that of 
speaking. This is not a trivial difference, but a fruitful shift in the way we see our 
talk exchanges. 
This shift is a distinctive feature of the rhetorical point of view and can be 
seen as another important result of the movement toward the outside. Rhetorical
thought is fi rmly anchored to the speaker/listener couple. Having an extra-lin-
guistic goal (persuasion), rhetoric makes it clear that to speak is always to speak 
to someone. Therefore, thinking about language from a rhetorical point of view 
allows us to emphasize that to speak is an intrinsically public activity and that it 
is “a constitutive and inseparable part of an extra-linguistic praxis” (Lo Piparo, 
2014b, 159). 
5. Rhetorical “artistic proofs” and the semantics of the word “language”
The Aristotelian passage that we are analyzing (Rhetoric 1358a 37-b1) is not 
only a general consideration but also it represents one of the organizing principles 
of Aristotle’s Rhetoric8. Indeed, the triad speaker, listener, topic is also the basis 
of the well-known triple-partition of the entechnoi pisteis (means of persuasion 
embodied in art or “artistic proofs”): ethos, pathos and logos. They are the rhetori-
cal means of persuasion (pisteis) provided “by us” and “through speech” (dia tou 
logou), opposed to the so-called atechnoi pisteis (“non-artistic” means of persu-
asion) that are not provided by us, but instead are pre-existing9. Each of the three 
entechnoi pisteis corresponds to one of the three elements of the triad: the fi rst, 
ethos, is the proof based “on the character of the speaker”, the second, pathos, 
consists “in disposing the hearer in some way” and the third, logos, is the “argu-
ment itself, by showing or seeming to show something” (Rhetoric 1356a 2-5).
Although variously interpreted, this triple-partition is generally considered as 
the most vital part of the Aristotelian Rhetoric. This is not the place to take into
account the many questions it raises and the different interpretations proposed. I li-
mit myself to only making some general remarks, in order to show its philosophical 
richness. 
8. It is not possible here to deal with all of the consequences of this idea on the entire Aristotelian rhetorical system.
I limit myself to only indicating that the classical distinction between the three species of rhetoric: deliberative, foren-
sic and epidictic (cf. Rhetoric 1358b 1) are also based on it.
9. Aristotle Rhetoric 1355b, 37-40: “I call atechnic those that are not provided by “us” [i.e. the potential speaker] but 
are pre-existing: for example, witnesses, testimony of slaves taken under torture, contracts, and such like; and artistic 
whatever can be prepared by method and by “us”; thus, one must use the former and invent the latter”.
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First of all, it is worth noting that the three entechnoi pisteis are closely con-
nected to each other and, if the speech is effective, persuasion can be seen as 
the result of the interaction between ethos, pathos and logos (see Grimaldi 1972; 
Fortenbaugh 2003; Garver 1994; Dow 2007). This is a direct consequence of the 
basic insight of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Indeed, if speakers and listeners are inside 
and not outside the speech, ethos and pathos can be seen as internal components of 
the persuasive process and not only as external (or, worse, “irrational”) expedients. 
Also, this can be seen as a fruitful result of the movement toward the outside 
typical of the rhetoric point of view. Indeed, the consideration of ethos and pathos 
as entechnoi pisteis – namely pisteis realized “through speech” – is another way of 
extending the semantics of the word “language” and situating it within a broader 
horizon. This clearly emerges if we consider what Aristotle says about these three 
rhetorical pisteis more closely.
6. Rhetorical ethos and the philosophy of language
Let us begin with ethos. Aristotle (Rhetoric 1365 a 4-13) describes it in this way:
There is persuasion (pistis) through character (ethos) whenever the speech is spoken in such 
a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence (axiopiston); for we believe (pisteuomen) 
fair-minded (epieikes) people to a greater extent and more quickly [then we do others] on all 
subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge (akribes) but 
room for doubt (amphidoxein). And this should result from the speech, not from a previous opi-
nion than the speaker is a certain kind of person; for it is not the case, as some of the technical 
writers propose in their treatment of the art, that fair-mindedness (epieikeia) on the part of the 
speaker makes no contribution to persuasiveness; rather, character (ethos) is almost, so to speak, 
the controlling factor in persuasion. 
The ethos Aristotle is referring to in this passage is not the pre-existing reputation 
of the speaker, but a character constructed “through logos”. Indeed, Aristotle is not 
saying that the speaker’s credibility makes the speech credible but the inverse; he 
is stating that the way in which the speech is spoken makes the speaker trustworthy. 
Therefore, the speaker’s trustworthiness is not a precondition (prerequisite) but an 
effect that he/she must achieve thanks to his/her speech. Although important for 
“all subjects in general,” the relevance of this effect is particularly evident when 
the issues at stake leave room for doubt, as in the case of persuasive speech. 
It is important to bear in mind that in the Aristotelian perspective, there is nothing 
irrational in giving weight to the character of the speaker. Indeed, as Garver (1994, 
191-192) has rightly pointed out, in Aristotle’s Rhetoric:
Logos and ethos are integrated. […] There is a mutual implication and interdependence between 
the two terms. We trust a speaker, and impute arete and phronesis to him, when he presents us 
with a cogent and intelligent argument. We infer from logos to ethos. But rhetorical arguments 
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are about indeterminate matters. So, in order to regard an argument as cogent and intelligent, we 
have to trust the speaker. […] We need trust to perceive the argument correctly. We infer from 
ethos to logos. It is the interdependence of ethos and logos that prevents such inferences from 
becoming a vicious circle. 
This way of understanding the role of the speaker’s trustworthiness is possible 
only thanks to the consideration of the speaker as an internal factor of the speech 
instead of as an external user. Regarding the specifi c aim of this paper, this crucial 
role of ethos is further evidence of the richness of the rhetorical point of view. 
Indeed, it makes clear that in our concrete linguistic practices the sharp distinction 
between who speaks and what is said is not a starting point but the result of a 
process of abstraction. Of course, the problem is not the abstraction in itself but 
its removal. Indeed, in some conditions and for specifi c purposes, the abstraction 
of what is said from who speaks can be useful (if not necessary) but we must not 
forget that it is only an abstraction and that in our real speech acts we always have 
the Aristotelian triad (the person speaking, the person spoken to and the topic 
spoken about). Instead, the removal of this abstraction can produce the dangerous 
illusion that there are speeches that are independent from speakers and listeners. 
The rhetorical point of view on language is immune from this illusion. Once again, 
we are faced with one of the consequences of the movement toward the outside, 
which is able to include aspects that are not (or do not seem to be) linguistic within 
the domain of philosophy of language.
7. Rhetorical pathos and the philosophy of language
Something similar can be said concerning pathos, the rhetorical proof provided 
“through the hearers when they are lead to feel emotion (pathos) by the speech” 
(Rhetoric 1356 a 14-15). In this case, the extra-linguistic element that is included 
is desire (orexis). I believe that this inclusion is one of the most fruitful advantages 
of the rhetorical point of view on language. To better understand this statement, 
we briefl y need to take into account the role of desire and its link with judgment 
and action in Aristotle’s anthropology. According to Aristotle, in the case of prac-
tical reason, our judgments can never be independent from our desires. Indeed, 
“thought (logos) by itself moves nothing” but “what moves us is thought aiming 
at some goal and concerned with action” (Nicomachean Ethics 1139 a 35-36). To 
move a living being, it is necessary that it feels pleasure or pain. Human beings are 
no exception. Certainly, in the case of human beings the action is not only a matter 
of pleasure and pain, even if these are necessary to act. Human action (praxis) is 
possible only thanks to the strict connection between desire and judgment (see 
De Anima, 432b 27- 33b 30). Or, to put things in a better way, an action is human 
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in that it is a result of this connection. Therefore, since a persuasive speech is a 
speech that aims to convince the audience to make a practical choice (namely to 
judge in view of an action), the reason why desire can’t be neglected is clear. Once 
again, it is the pursuit of persuasion that necessitates the inclusion of desire – and 
therefore of the living body – in the domain of refl ection on language. 
This is not a reductionist move that leads everything back to language. The chal-
lenging task is to be able to conceive of logos and orexis – to use the Aristotelian 
image – as convex and concave in the circumference of a circle that is “distinct by 
defi nition but by nature inseparable” (Nicomachean Ethics 1102a 27-30)10. This 
means that we have to make a double movement: on the one hand, we have to ack-
nowledge that language affects human emotions (including those originally more 
distant from the verbal sphere) or even produces them; on the other hand, we must 
not forget that language can have this power on human emotions only if logos is 
rooted in orexis. 
This intertwining between logos and orexis also emerges in the rich analysis of 
pathe, which is the subject of a great part of book II (Rhetoric 1378 a 31-1388b 
30). It is important to emphasize – in accordance with what I said before – that 
Aristotle’s is a philosophical analysis (and this not despite his rhetorical desti-
nation but thanks to it)11. It is carried out following a rigorous method. First of 
all, each pathos is defi ned and then analyzed according three aspects (that can be 
traced back to the three components of speech seen before): the people more inc-
lined to feel that emotion (and his/her state of mind); the people with whom they 
usually feel that emotion and fi nally on what grounds they feel it (Rhetoric 1378 a 
23-25). Following this method, Aristotle paints a rich picture of human emotions 
from which the complex relation between language and emotional sphere emer-
ges. This is not the occasion to consider this analysis in detail; I limit myself to 
only emphasizing that its richness is a further sign of the philosophical potentiality 
of rhetoric. As in the case of ethos, considering pathos as a pistis realized “through 
speech” entails acknowledging that a refl ection about language and its power can-
not exclude the sphere of desire. 
Moreover, this inclusion is also the basis of one of the fundamental principles of 
Aristotelian rhetoric: the idea according to which the more a speech can hold to-
gether pleasure and knowledge the more persuasive it will be12. This implies that, 
in order to be persuasive, we should not separate the emotional component from 
the cognitive one. The relationship between these two spheres is not an extrinsic
juxtaposition but something like a chiasm. According to Aristotle, a speech is 
10. See Lo Piparo (2003, 10-11).
11. See Fortenbaugh (2002) and Piazza (2008b).
12. See Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1357a 8-22; 1395bb 27-30; 1400b 29-35; 1404b 32-37; 1405a 8-26; 1409a 35-1409b 6; 
1410b 10-36; 1412a 13; 1414 a 23-29.
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persuasive not because it produces knowledge and, in addition, pleasure, but be-
cause it is able to produce pleasant knowledge and pleasure that produces know-
ledge simultaneously (Piazza, 2015). Once again, it is just the rhetorical point 
of view that shows this chiasm between pleasure and knowledge, a chiasm that 
it is not merely limited to persuasive speech in a narrow sense. Indeed, we also 
fi nd it in the famous Aristotelian description of the human being as “desiderative 
reason” (orektikos nous) or “rational desire” (orexis dianoetike) (Nicomachean 
Ethics 1139b 4-5; cf. Lo Piparo 2003, 14-19).
8. Rhetorical logos and the philosophy of language
The philosophical fruitfulness of rhetorical thought (as well as its orientation 
towards the outside) also emerges if we take into account the third rhetorical pistis 
corresponding to “what is said” and consisting in the “argument (logos, speech) it-
self, by showing or seeming to show something” (Rhetoric 1356a 2-5). In particu-
lar, the Aristotelian treatment of this pistis allows us to shed light on the complex 
relationship between rhetoric and truth. Aristotle (Rhetoric 1356a 19-21) descri-
bes this pistis in this way: “persuasion is effected through the speech itself when 
we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments 
suitable to the case in question”. As we can see, this rhetorical pistis jeopardizes 
the role of truth in the persuasive speech. In contrast with the traditional idea – 
to some extent due to Plato – that rhetoric has nothing to do with the truth, here 
Aristotle clearly shows a different perspective. The practical aim of rhetorical 
discourse does not imply indifference or disregard for truth. Persuading someone 
of something, namely convincing the hearers to change their minds and to act ac-
cordingly, cannot do without truth or, better, without what the hearers believe true. 
Of course, the rhetorical point of view on truth is different from that of a logician 
or a scientist. Nevertheless, the issues raised by rhetoric about truth are eminently 
philosophical and very far from being resolved. The truth rhetoric is dealing with 
is never a universal and necessary truth but always a contingent and fallible one. 
This feature is strictly dependent on the nature of the rhetorical issues that are, 
using an Aristotelian terminology, issues that can be otherwise and have a for the 
most part regularity (Di Piazza 2011). These are those things that precisely becau-
se of their nature (and not only because of our cognitive limits) cannot be a subject 
of a stable and ultimate knowledge. 
The issues at stake in rhetorical discourses are, by defi nition, issues on which 
there is no agreement. The rhetorical point of view shows how hard it is to draw 
a sharp boundary between truth and apparent truth or between truth and persu-
asiveness. Describing the third entechnoi pisteis as the one that proves “a truth 
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or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in
question” (Rhetoric 1356a 19-21) entails recognizing that the starting point is
always the persuasive argument and that the truth we are dealing with is, by defi -
nition, a precarious one. It is the reason why in the rhetoric fi eld the notion of eikos 
(generally translated as likelihood or probable) plays a crucial role. Without going 
into the details, it is important to bear in mind that, according to Aristotle, the eikos 
is not an imitation (least of all a manipulation) of the truth but the truth appropriate 
to rhetorical issues, i.e., a truth always exposed to failure (Piazza and Di Piazza 
2012). Actually, since rhetorical speech deals with intrinsically questionable issu-
es (on which we must make a choice) it faces the diffi culty of establishing the 
truth of claims on which our collective or individual life might depend. Therefore, 
anything but indifferent to true and false, rhetoric brings into focus not only the 
diffi culty of truth but also its complex link with another couple of values. Indeed, 
in rhetorical speech the true/false couple is always to some extent linked to the 
just/unjust, advantageous/harmful and honorable/shameful couples that are the
value couples that the hearer must pass judgment on for each species of rhetorical 
discourse (forensic, deliberative and epideictic Rhetoric 1358 a 36-59 a30).
In Foucault’s terms, we could say that rhetoric is interested in “truth-telling” 
or veridiction rather than truth. Indeed, we could apply to rhetoric what Foucault 
(2014, 28) says in the inauguration of the course of lectures delivered at the 
Catholic University of Louvain on the avowal (italics mine):
It is, of course, certainly possible, it is certainly legitimate, and certainly desirable to study truth-
-telling, to study the assertions from the point of view of the formal or empirical conditions that 
allow one to say whether they are true or false. But I think that one can also study truth-telling 
from something of an ethnological perspective I mean truth-telling as a social practice – to study 
it as a weapon in relationships between individuals, to study it as a means of modifying relations 
of power among those who speak, and fi nally as an element within an institutional structure. 
This is exactly the rhetorical point of view. Indeed, rhetoric concerns what Foucault 
(2014, 39) calls – using a successful neologism – alethurgy, namely a “ritual 
procedure for bringing forth alethes”. This alethurgy is at the heart of rhetoric and 
reveals, once again, the necessary movement toward the outside of which Esposito 
speaks. In this case, the outside is the power or, better, the relations of power 
among those who speak and the political framework within which truth-telling 
occurs. 
Thanks to this particular conception of truth as a social practice and as a weapon 
in relationships between individuals, the rhetorical point of view is also able to 
take the agonistic dimension of these relationships into account without trying to 
expel it. Thanks to this inclusion of confl ict, the rhetorical point of view on langu-
age is also able to bring out the diffi cult relationship between word and violence, 
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a relationship that cannot be reduced to a simple mutual exclusion (Piazza 2008c; 
Virno 2013, 21; Serra 2014). Considered from this perspective, rhetoric reveals 
its anthropological values and shows that persuasive speech is at the very heart of 
human nature.
9. Conclusions
Finally, what I am arguing is that the rhetoric is not a repertoire of concepts 
and means of persuasion, not even just a theory of speaking well, but a way of 
thinking, a particular and fruitful point of view on language. The main advantage 
of this point of view is its attention to the extra-linguistic components or, more 
exactly, to the intertwining between linguistic and non-linguistic aspects of social 
practices. As we have seen, since rhetoric has an extra-linguistic aim (persuasion), 
it is in a privileged position to understand this intertwining. Paradoxical though 
it may appear, the rhetorical point of view allows us to see that to understand 
how human language works, we need to look beyond it and to move toward the 
outside. It is exactly this movement that involves the theoretical consequences 
that I have tried to clarify in this paper. First of all, the inclusion of speakers and 
listeners as essential components of speech and the awareness that speech is the 
result of the relationship of the person speaking, the person spoken to and the to-
pic spoken about. Thanks to this awareness, the rhetorical point of view assigns 
a key position to the listeners and considers our talk exchanges from the point of 
view of listening and not only from that of speaking. Moreover, the practical aim 
of rhetoric also requires the inclusion of the emotional sphere in the fi eld of refl ec-
tion on language, paying attention to the intertwining between speech (logos) and 
desire (orexis). Finally, the rhetorical point of view also reveals how problematic 
the achievement of truth is and considers it as social practice without removing 
its agonistic dimension. Thanks to all of these features, rhetoric turns out to be a 
fruitful way of practicing the philosophy of language.
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